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 AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
 THOMAS A. CAVANAUGH 
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
 
In this paper, I present Aquinas's account of double-effect reasoning (DER) -- 
often called the "principle," "rule," or "doctrine" of double effect. Often, if not 
always, DER is attributed to Thomas Aquinas tout court.
i
 Yet, I will argue, 
Thomas's account substantially differs from contemporary double-effect reasoning 
(DER) insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of risking an assailant's life 
while contemporary accounts of DER focus on actions causing harm foreseen as 
inevitable.
ii
 
 Of course, if DER applies to cases in which harm is foreseen as an 
inevitable result of an otherwise good action, it will apply to cases in which harm 
is foreseen as being a possible consequence. The reverse, however, need not 
obtain. For example, one might think that it is ethical for an ironworker 
knowingly to risk his life doing dangerous work while one would not think it 
ethical for the ironworker knowingly to do work from which his death would 
follow inevitably. Thus, one might think that it is ethical to risk causing harm 
which one would not think it ethical to cause inevitably. I will argue that Aquinas 
holds something like this point in his account of DER. 
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Q.64, a.7 and "Praeter Intentionem"  
 The locus classicus of double-effect reasoning is Aquinas' discussion of 
homicidal self-defense found in S.t. IIaIIae, q.64, a.7.
iii
 Q. 64 occurs within 
Aquinas's consideration of vices opposed to commutative justice. Q. 64 concerns 
what Aquinas considers the greatest injury committed upon one's neighbor against 
his will: his death. 
 In article seven, Thomas asks whether it is licit to kill a man in 
self-defense. He offers a number of objections against the liceity of so acting. St. 
Augustine voices two objections. The first comes from his epistle to Publicola; the 
second Thomas takes from Augustine's De Libero arbitrio. There Augustine asks: 
How are they free from sin in the sight of divine providence 
who, for the sake of these contemnible things have taken a 
human life? (q.64, a.7, ob.2) 
Aquinas notes that among the slight goods which men may forfeit against their 
wills, Augustine includes corporeal life. Augustine appears to rule out homicidal 
self-defense. 
 Aquinas interprets Augustine as not permitting the intentional taking of 
an aggressor's life. Thomas has noted earlier in his discussion of war (q. 40, a.1) 
that Augustine thinks it licit for one charged with the public good to take life 
during a war. Accordingly, in q. 64, a.7, Aquinas considers the bailiff and the 
soldier to be agents who may in self-defense and as public officials intentionally 
take the life of an aggressor. Thus, in q. 64, a.7, the self-defense of particular 
interest is that of the private individual, as such, taking the life of an assailant. 
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 The corpus of q.64, a.7 reads: 
Nothing prevents one act from having two effects, of which 
only one is intended, the other being praeter intentionem. 
Now moral acts receive their character (speciem) according 
to that which is intended, not, however, from that which is 
praeter intentionem, since this is accidental, as is evident 
from what has been said earlier.
iv
 Thus, from the act of 
self-defense, two effects may follow: one, the conservation 
of one's own life; the other, the death of the aggressor 
(occisio invadentis). Since what is intended is the 
conservation of one's own life, such an act is not illicit: it is 
natural for each thing to preserve itself in existence for as 
long as it is able. Nevertheless, some act proceeding from a 
good intention may be rendered illicit if it is not 
proportioned to the end (proportionatus fini). Thus, it 
would not be licit if someone defending his own life were 
to use more force than necessary. But, if he repels force 
with moderation, his defensive act will be licit: for, 
according to the jurists, it is licit to repel force by force, 
with the moderation of a blameless defense (cum 
moderamine inculpatae tutelae.) Nor is it necessary for 
salvation that a man forego an act of moderate force in 
order to avoid the death of another: since one is more 
responsible (plus tenetur) to care for (providere) one's 
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own life than someone else's. But, since to kill a man is not 
licit except for the public authority acting for the sake of 
the common good (as is evident from what was previously 
said [article 3]), it is not licit for a man to intend to kill 
another man in order to defend himself, except for those 
who have public authority. These, intending to kill a man in 
self-defense, refer this to the public good. This is evident in 
the case of a soldier fighting an enemy, and in the case of a 
minister of the judge fighting (pugnante) against thieves. 
Nevertheless, even these would sin if they were moved by 
private animosity. 
What does Thomas mean by the phrase "praeter intentionem?" I will argue that 
in q.64, a.7, Aquinas uses "praeter intentionem" to refer to a characteristic, but 
not exclusive result which is not accidental, nor intentional, nor inevitable. I will 
argue that Aquinas understands justified private homicidal self-defense to be an 
action in which the defendant risked killing the assailant. 
 To do something which one foresees as inevitably resulting in the death of 
the assailant is not to risk the assailant's life knowingly. To risk the aggressor's life 
knowingly is not to do something which one foresees as inevitably resulting in the 
assailant's death. Yet, contemporary accounts of DER paradigmatically apply to 
knowingly causing inevitable harm. In this respect, Thomas's account 
substantially differs from the accounts offered by contemporary theorists of DER. 
 
Praeter Intentionem: Intended or Accidental? 
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 To what does "praeter intentionem" refer? In this section I argue against 
three interpretations of this phrase. I will argue first, that "praeter intentionem" 
clearly does not refer to what one intends; second, that it does not refer to 
something intended in some special sense; and, third, that it does not refer to an 
accidental consequence of one's action. 
 With respect to what "praeter intentionem" in q.64, a.7 means, Aquinas 
refers his reader to an earlier article. There he maintains that: 
[A]ctive scandal is accidental when it is outside the 
intention (praeter intentionem) of the agent: as when a 
man by his inordinate deed or word does not intend to give 
another an occasion of downfall, but only to satisfy his 
will.
v
  
Clearly, Aquinas does not use "praeter intentionem" to refer to what one does 
intend. 
 Yet, as Steven Windass notes, by "praeter intentionem" Aquinas has 
been taken to mean that: 
[Y]ou can in case of necessity kill in self-defence, provided 
that in a special theological sense you do not intend to do 
so.
vi
 
Some interpreters of Aquinas do attribute to him an idiosyncratic method of 
intention. Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. notes: 
Aquinas is one of the chief architects of the tradition in 
which the doctrine of direction of intention was 
developed.
vii
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We encounter an account of the direction of one's intention in Pascal's famous 
parody of Jesuit casuistry found in the seventh of Les lettres Provinciales. There 
Pascal presents his famous Jesuit's infamous grande methode de diriger 
l'intention.
viii
 According to Pascal's Jesuit, by following this method one can 
stroll about the dueling green, not intending to fight one's opponent, but intending 
to walk about. Of course, if one's opponent attacked, one could defend oneself. 
This, following the logic of the method of directing one's intention, would not be 
dueling.
ix
 Aquinas himself, however, nowhere articulates such a doctrine. 
 Boyle claims that such a doctrine grounds DER. He says: 
The doctrine of the double effect presupposes at least this: 
that one can direct his intention to the good effect of his 
action and withhold it from the bad effect if the latter is not 
a means to the former.
x
 
Such a direction of intention or withholding of intention would itself be 
intentional. Insofar as DER theorists think that intentions are ethically relevant, 
they will presumably think that intentions with respect to one's intentions, 
second-order intentions, are also ethically relevant. Of course, directing one's 
intention would be a second-order intention.
xi
 
 DER does not repose -- indeed, may not be able to repose -- on the 
direction, withholding, or paring of one's intentions. It does, however, rest on 
one's being able to foresee harm without intending harm. It is at best an infelicity 
to speak of not intending some foreseen harm as directing one's intention away 
from the foreseen harm. If there were such a method of intention, it would found a 
"morality of gestures and poses."
xii
 In any case, Aquinas does not propose such a 
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morality, nor does he use "praeter intentionem" to refer to some special way of 
intending. 
 Aquinas says that what is praeter intentionem is per accidens. He has 
been interpreted as meaning that it is accidental in the sense of being an accidental 
consequence. For example, referring to q.64, a.7, Anthony Kenny claims: 
In the context it is not clear whether Aquinas is justifying 
accidental killing in the course of a struggle or intentional 
killing when this is the only way to avoid being killed.
xiii
 
Yet, Aquinas explicitly denies the justifiability of a private individual's intentional 
killing of an aggressor (q. 64, a.7 corpus and ad 2). Does Aquinas mean to speak, 
as Kenny suggests, of an accidental killing in the course of a struggle? 
 What would it mean to say that one accidentally killed another in the 
course of a struggle? It would mean that one were engaged in pushing and shoving 
and pulling another and that the aggressor's death came about, say, by his tripping, 
falling, and breaking his neck. Such a death would result accidentally, just as 
someone could die while engaged in friendly horseplay.   If this is what 
Aquinas means when he claims that what is praeter intentionem is accidental, 
then he has brought out an unwieldy concept to attend to what almost every 
action-theorist acknowledges: an agent is not responsible for consequences which 
accidentally result from his actions. Moreover, in the article immediately 
subsequent to that on self-defense, Aquinas asks whether an agent who has killed 
a man by chance (casualiter occidens hominem, a. 8) is guilty of homicide. He 
answers in the negative. This discussion already would have been addressed if 
what is praeter intentionem were per accidens in the sense of an accidental 
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consequence. So, besides the generally acknowledged point that agents are not 
responsible for the accidental consequences of their actions, q.64, a.8 would lead 
one to think that Thomas does not use "praeter intentionem" to refer to an 
accidental consequence. 
 Yet, Kenny is not alone in his interpretation. Steven Windass, in a separate 
investigation, understands Thomas to consider the attacker's death an accidental 
consequence. Offering what he takes to be Aquinas's position, Windass says: 
[I]t is lawful to repel force by force; if this results in the death of the 
attacker, the death will be accidental.
xiv
 
As noted, there are good reasons internal to his discussion to think that Aquinas 
does not mean that the death of the assailant will be accidental. Windass notes 
that: 
[I]t would be very odd [of Aquinas] to discuss the 
permissibility of different kinds of accident.
xv
 
I agree. It would be very odd of Thomas to use such a distinction to discuss kinds 
of accidental consequences. I take this to be a reason to think that Aquinas does 
not so use "praeter intentionem." 
 I have argued that Aquinas does not use "praeter intentionem" to refer -- 
as some have thought -- to what one intends, or to what one directs one's intention 
away from, or to an accidental consequence. In order to understand what he means 
when he says in q. 64, a.7 that what is "praeter intentionem is per accidens," I 
will now briefly investigate Thomas's account of intention and the elements he 
proposes for the ethical assessment of acts. 
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Intention and the Ethical Analysis of an Act 
 In IaIIae, q.12, Aquinas considers intention. In q.12, a.1, Aquinas claims, 
"intention, just as the very word implies, means to tend to something [in aliquid 
tendere]". Since the will (voluntas) moves the powers of the soul to their 
appropriate ends, it is evident, Thomas asserts, that intention is an act of the will. 
He argues that intention is the act of the will with respect to the end "as the term 
towards which something is ordained" (IaIIae, q.12, a.1, ad 4). 
 According to Thomas, we will the end, we choose the means, and we 
intend the complex, end-through-means. Using Aquinas's example, when we 
intend health, we intend health-by-means-of-medicine. We choose 
medicine-for-the-sake-of-health. How does Aquinas understand the agent's 
intention to relate to the goodness of the agent's act? 
 Thomas offers an elaborate account of the goodness and badness of human 
actions in IaIIae, qs. 18, 19, 20, and 21. For the sake of understanding his 
statement in q.64, a.7, it is not necessary to articulate his entire analysis. 
Nevertheless, what he has to say about the relation of the intention of the end to 
the moral analysis of the goodness or badness of an act requires attention. 
 Aquinas proposes a complex analysis of actions. Each aspect relates 
variously to the others. This reflects the Dionysian dictum that goodness is 
integral; evil, the lack of such integrity, vitiates what otherwise is morally good 
(IaIIae, q.19, a.6, ad 1).
xvi
 For the moral assessment of an act, three aspects of the 
act require attention, as Aquinas argues: what is being done (the deed or object), 
the circumstances in which it is done, and the end or reason it is done (IaIIae, 
q.18, a.1.) 
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 According to Thomas, of the aspects of an action which make up its 
integral goodness or its disintegrated badness, the intention of the end is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a complete analysis of the action's 
ethical status. 
 In the light of his account of the relation between intention and the ethical 
analysis of action, it becomes clear what Aquinas means in q.64, a.7 when he 
asserts that, "moral acts receive their character according to what is intended, not 
according to what is praeter intentionem, for this is per accidens". Clearly, 
Thomas asserts that what is praeter intentionem is not essential to establishing 
the agent's action as good or as bad. 
 If the assailant's death results from a private individual's justified act of 
self-defense and the death is neither intended nor accidental, how is the death 
further, and positively, characterized? In q.64, a.7, Aquinas proposes and contrasts 
two cases of homicidal self-defense, that of a public official and that of a private 
individual. I will contrast these two cases in order to characterize, in a positive 
manner, the death of an assailant in the case of a private individual's justified 
homicidal self-defense. 
 
Two Cases Contrasted 
 Aquinas holds that an officer of the polity -- a police officer in 
contemporary terms -- can intend to take the life of his aggressor as long as he 
uses minimal force (proportionatus fini), refers the slaying to the common good, 
and does not harbor animosity against the attacker (q.64, a.7.) In the case of a 
private individual's justified homicidal self-defense, Thomas accepts the slaying 
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of the assailant as long as it results from the use of minimal force and is not 
intentional. In both cases there is the common requirement that the force used is 
proportionatus fini. I take this to mean that the force used is minimal; that is, not 
more than is necessary for the preservation of one's life. 
 Say that I am a private individual. Both I and my assailant have swords. 
We begin to fight with them. I realize that my aggressor has far greater endurance 
than I and that the only way I can preserve my life is to kill him, say by cutting off 
his head. According to Thomas, I cannot do so because I cannot intentionally kill 
him. Thus, if this case were to obtain, then, according to Thomas, I, as a private 
individual, would not be permitted so to defend myself. If I were an officer of the 
state, however, executing my role as such, and I were in this same situation, 
Aquinas holds it permissible for me intentionally to take the life of the aggressor 
by cutting of his head. 
 Thus, while in both cases the force used must be proportionatus fini, this 
corresponds to a larger set of possible responses in the case of the officer of the 
state. For, according to Thomas, the officer of the state may proximately intend to 
take his assailant's life. Therefore, he may use a neck-severing sword stroke, for it 
is proportioned to this end. 
 In the case of a private individual, however, minimal force does not 
include cases in which such force corresponds to an intention to take the life of 
the attacker. For, according to Thomas, the private individual cannot  
intentionally take the assailant's life. Thus, the private individual cannot use 
means proportioned to the taking of the aggressor's life. A neck-severing sword 
stroke is such a means. Such a sword stroke is proportioned to the preservation of 
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one's own life only insofar as it is proportioned to the taking of the aggressor's 
life. Therefore, according to Thomas, a private individual cannot use such a sword 
stroke. 
 Thus, when Windass asserts that asking for double effect's reading of an 
ethical act of self-defense, "you can be fairly sure that ... your original impression 
of what you could actually do would not be changed,"
xvii
 he is right about the 
pilloried Jesuit of Pascal's seventh provincial letter, but not about Thomas. 
 I have assumed that Aquinas would permit the use of a weapon, and even a 
potentially deadly one, a sword. A weapon is an instrument. As an instrument it 
admits of characteristic ends. One defending his own life with a sword may not 
maintain that the assailant's death results accidentally from the employment of a 
sword. One of the ends to which sword-makers fashion swords is the taking of 
human life. Presumably, a sword not fit for the taking of another's life is not much 
of a sword. 
 The use of a sword contrasts with pushing an attacker, who then stumbles 
on the curb, falls, and dies of a broken neck. Characteristically, pushing, shoving, 
pulling, scratching, biting, kicking, gouging, and generally being a great nuisance 
to an aggressor does not result in his death. If death were to result from such acts, 
it would result accidentally. Because death does not characteristically result from 
the ingenious deployment of teeth, nails, knees, elbows, and fists, one's attacker 
could not charge one with endangering his life by so defending oneself. 
 If one were to use a sword, however, the attacker could claim that his life 
had been endangered. This is significant for two reasons. First, although the one 
defending himself by means of a sword may not intend to take the life of the 
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aggressor, he is willing to risk taking the aggressor's life. Second, if intending to 
take another's life differs from knowingly endangering another's life, then there is 
something else besides either the assailant's death resulting intentionally or the 
death resulting accidentally; namely, there is the assailant's death resulting as a 
risked consequence. I will now develop this point. 
 
Risking Homicide 
 Accidental homicide differs from homicide which results from having 
endangered life. In an accidental killing, the agent inculpably does not foresee the 
death. When death results from having knowingly endangered someone's life, 
however, the agent foresaw the death as a possible consequence of his action. 
Accordingly, when one kills someone accidentally, one is not ethically 
responsible for his death; when one kills someone whose life one has knowingly 
endangered, one is ethically responsible for his death. Thus, killing someone 
accidentally importantly differs from killing someone whose life one has 
knowingly endangered. 
 Does intentionally killing someone differ from killing someone as the 
result of risking his life? When one intends to take another's life, one certainly 
endangers his life. Indeed, being the object of someone's intention to kill is 
probably the most extreme case of having one's life endangered. Does one intend 
to take another's life if one endangers another's life? For example, does one intend 
to take one's own life when one endangers one's own life? 
 Soldiers, stuntmen, race-car drivers, police officers, firefighters, and 
construction workers knowingly endanger their lives. Do they intend their own 
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deaths? Perhaps some of them do and perhaps some of them ought not so to 
endanger their lives even if they do not intend to take them. In any case, it would 
indeed be an eccentric theory of intention which concluded that anyone who 
knowingly imperilled his life intended his death. Similarly, there is no reason to 
say that knowingly jeopardizing another's life is to intend the other's death. 
 Chancing the assailant's life is precisely what I do if I do not intend to take 
his life, but I knowingly risk it in defense of my own life. I choose to risk his life 
rather than to forfeit my own, and such a choice on my part is ethically assessable. 
That the assailant's death characteristically might follow from my using a sword in 
defense of my life indicates that I am more willing to preserve my life than I am to 
forego hazarding the assailant's. 
 As I understand Aquinas, he proposes that a private individual may not 
intend to take the life of an assailant, while he may knowingly risk the assailant's 
life by defending himself with such force that the aggressor's death, if it results, 
would be one of the foreseeable characteristic consequences of the self-defensive 
act. 
 This interpretation may strike some as novel. Nevertheless, it accords with 
what Aquinas himself implies when he asserts that: 
[T]he act of fornication or of adultery is not ordered to the 
conservation of one's own life out of necessity as is the act 
from which sometimes (quandoque) follows homicide 
(q.64, a.7, ad 4). 
Aquinas restricts "praeter intentionem," as he uses it in his consideration of 
self-defense, to what occurs sometimes, but not always. Thus, in q.64, a.7 
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Aquinas does not appear to consider the foresight of an inevitable consequence, 
for such a consequence would not be said to follow "sometimes." 
 Joseph Boyle, Jr., however, offers an interpretation of q.64. a.7, which 
substantially differs from my account. He notes that: 
The use of `quandoque' to describe the frequency of the 
deadly consequence following from an act of self-defense 
suggests that the assailant's death is not a natural and totally 
predictable consequence of the act as such.
xviii
  
Boyle, nonetheless, denies that "quandoque" has this meaning in q.64, a.7. He 
asserts that the assailant's death is foreseen as a totally predictable and inevitable 
consequence of the act of moderate self-defense proposed by Aquinas. 
 Having noted that with "quandoque" Thomas seems to exclude some acts 
of self-defense, Boyle observes: 
[T]here appear to be types of self-defense in which the use 
of the minimum force needed to preserve one's life does 
have the assailant's death as a natural and certainly 
foreseeable consequence.
xix
  
I agree. There are such instances, such as the neck-severing sword stroke I 
mentioned earlier. As I have argued, Aquinas rules out precisely such a case. 
Boyle, however, thinks that Aquinas considers such an act to be ethically in the 
clear. 
 Boyle notes that Thomas uses "praeter intentionem" one hundred and 
forty-three times in his massive œevre.xx Boyle concedes that Thomas usually 
uses this term to refer to consequences which follow sometimes, or rarely. As 
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Boyle notes, Aquinas infrequently uses "praeter intentionem" to refer to 
consequences which follow always or for the most part.
xxi
 I do not dispute this 
point. I do maintain, however, that Thomas does not use "praeter intentionem" 
in q.64, a.7 to refer to an assailant's death foreseen as inevitable. That is, q.64, a.7 
is not one of the rare cases in which Thomas uses "praeter intentionem" to refer 
to what happens always or for the most part. 
 Boyle's interpretation is problematic insofar as he discounts "quandoque" 
in ad 4 while noting that the minority of uses of "praeter intentionem" apply to 
cases in which a result follows always or for the most part. Thomas's use of 
"quandoque" in response to the fourth objection and his preponderant use of 
"praeter intentionem" to apply to what occurs infrequently, militate against 
Boyle's interpretation of "praeter intentionem" in q.64, a.7. Moreover, Boyle 
does not explain what Aquinas means by "quandoque" in ad 4 if he does not 
mean to restrict "praeter intentionem" to consequences which do not result for 
the most part. The onus of proving that "praeter intentionem" in q.64, a.7 refers 
to a consequence foreseen as inevitable falls upon Boyle. 
 In objection to my interpretation, one might argue that "quandoque" 
refers not to homicidal self-defense, but to self-defense in general. Thus, Thomas 
would be noting that self-defense is justified, even though the death of the 
aggressor sometimes follows from acts of self-defense. This, however, is a 
non-starter, for the question is whether homicidal self-defense is justified, not 
whether self-defense simpliciter is justified. Although it sounds awkward, one 
could say that Aquinas argues that when the conditions of DER have been met, a 
private individual's act of homicidal self-defense that is sometimes homicidal is 
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justified. 
 I have argued that in q.64, a.7, Aquinas uses "praeter intentionem" to 
refer to a risked consequence. In his discussion of homicidal self-defense, he does 
not extend this concept to inevitable results. In fact, in his response to the fourth 
objection, he limits his use of the distinction to cases in which the result follows 
sometimes, and thereby excludes from his justification cases in which the harm 
follows always. 
 In the standard contemporary cases of DER, such as strategic bombing 
which harms noncombatants and palliative morphine administration to a 
terminally ill patient which hastens or causes death, the harm is foreseen as an 
inevitable consequence of the action. In his account of a private individual's 
justified homicidal self-defense, Thomas holds that the defender knowingly 
risked the assailant's life. This excludes the use of means which one foresees as 
inevitably resulting in death, for one could not be said knowingly to risk killing 
the aggressor if one foresaw that one would inevitably kill the aggressor. Thus, 
Aquinas's originating account of DER substantially differs from what DER has 
become insofar as Thomas restricts his account to cases in which one can be said 
to risk foreseen harm. 
 
The Second Condition of DER 
 Aquinas's account of DER is not simply that it is ethically in the clear to 
risk causing the death of one's assailant insofar as one does not intend to kill one's 
assailant.
xxii
 This is only the first condition of his account: the foreseen risked 
consequence is not intended. Like contemporary accounts of DER, Aquinas 
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argues that in addition to this first condition, a second condition must be met for 
the risking of the harm to be justified. He argues that: 
It is not necessary for salvation for a man to forego 
(praetermittat) an act of moderate defense in order to 
avoid (evitandum) the death of another, since a man is 
more responsible to provide (plus tenetur .. providere) for 
his own life than for that of another (q.64, a.7). 
Thomas asserts that one has a greater obligation to watch over one's own life than 
to do so over another's. Thus, when it comes to preserving lives, ceteris paribus, 
one is more obliged to preserve one's own than another's. Of course, covered by 
the "other things being equal" clause are such factors as the role one has with 
respect to the other's life at risk. For example, a captain of a sinking ship may be 
more obliged to care for a passenger's life than for his own. 
 When one's own life has been put at risk by an assailant, since one is, 
ceteris paribus, more bound to care for one's own life than for another's, one need 
not forego risking the attacker's life. One who would not defend his own life when 
this entails endangering the life of the attacker might exercise too little 
responsibility with respect to the good of life in his care. So, not only may 
self-defense be permissible, it may be required when not to defend one's own life 
is to act with too little care for what has been entrusted to one. 
 
Summary 
 Aquinas offers the following analysis of an act that is ethically in the clear, 
but for its risking foreseen harm. First, the harm cannot be intended. Second, the 
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act fulfills some responsibility the agent has which is greater than the 
responsibility the agent has to avoid the harm. 
 In his account of a private individual's justified homicidal self-defense, 
Thomas presents the seeds of DER as it is presently understood. Yet, in one 
important feature, his contribution differs from contemporary double-effect 
reasoning. That feature became evident in Thomas's use of "quandoque" to 
characterize the assailant's death as risked. 
 It requires a considerable, and, as I have argued, ultimately untenable 
interpretive stretch to attribute to Thomas the application of "praeter 
intentionem" in his treatment of a private individual's act of homicidal 
self-defense to cases in which the assailant's death is foreseen as resulting 
inevitably. Accordingly, one cannot attribute contemporary double-effect 
reasoning to Thomas tout court. 
 The point of this paper has been to argue that Thomas does not use DER to 
justify a private individual's homicidal self defense in cases in which the 
aggressor's death is foreseen as inevitable. He does use it in cases in which the 
assailant's life was risked. What is the value of noting this difference between 
Aquinas's account and contemporary accounts of DER? 
 If one does not note this difference, then one will attribute to Aquinas an 
idiosyncratic account of intention which he does not have. For example, Jeff 
McMahan, following the customary interpretation, says: 
Aquinas ... assumes that it is possible for one to foresee 
with certainty that one's act will kill one's assailant without 
intending the killing as a means of self-defence. ... To 
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illustrate [this] view, consider: 
Self Defence 1: One's only defence against an unjust and 
potentially lethal attack is to shoot the attacker at close 
range with a flame-thrower.
xxiii
 
McMahan thinks that Aquinas and "the followers of Aquinas" hold that this case 
is an instance of self-defense justified by DER.
xxiv
 If one thinks that a defender 
can shoot one's attacker at close range with a flame-thrower, and that this is not 
intentional, then one seems to rely on a very narrow conception of what it is to 
intend a means. But, if one relies on such an account, then how will one argue, for 
example, that a terror bomber cannot drop bombs on noncombatants without 
intending their deaths? If one can use DER in the case of self-defense presented 
by McMahan, then one seems able to use it in terror bombing as well. As 
McMahan notes, such an account of DER, "results in an unacceptably permissive 
doctrine."
xxv
 
 I trust that readers will realize that Thomas's account of DER is one which 
concerns the risking of harm. Accordingly, Thomas does not rely on an 
idiosyncratic account of intention which turns DER into the laxist account 
parodied by Pascal and rightly rejected by McMahan. 
 What does Thomas's account imply about the contemporary application of 
DER to cases, such as death-hastening palliative morphine administration to a 
terminally ill patient and strategic bombing which harms non-combatants, in 
which agents foresee the harm as resulting inevitably? Are there ethically relevant 
differences between self-defense and other cases of DER?
xxvi
 These questions 
deserve consideration; nonetheless, they belong to a paper other than the present 
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one. 
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i.The standard article on the history of DER is Joseph 
Mangan's "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double 
Effect," Theological Studies 10 (1949):41-61. J. Ghoos 
differs with Mangan over exactly where in Aquinas's work 
the sources of DER can be found: J. Ghoos, "L'Acte a Double 
Effet; Étude de Théologie Positive," Ephemerides 
Theologicae Lovanienses, XXVII (1951):30-52. In fact, what 
Ghoos notes, although not explicitly, is the conflation 
by Thomas's interpreters of two distinct strands in 
Aquinas's work: the indirect voluntary of S.t. IaIIae, 
q.6, a.3 and double effect of S.t. IIaIIae, q.64, a.7. 
For a more recent consideration of the history of DER see 
L.I. Ugorji, The Principle of Double Effect; A Critical 
Appraisal of its Traditional Understanding and its Modern 
  
  
 22 
  
Reinterpretation (Frankfurt am Main:Peter Lang, 1985). 
ii.See: Jeff McMahan, "Revising the Doctrine of Double 
Effect," Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11.2 
(1994):201-212; Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and 
Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect," Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 18 (1989):334-351; and Joseph Boyle, 
"Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect," 
Ethics, 90 (1980):527-538. 
iii.Unless noted otherwise, references to Aquinas's work 
will be to the Summa theologiae, Roma:Editiones Paulinae, 
1962, IIaIIae; translations by the author. 
iv.Editors normally cite q.43, a.3 which concerns scandal 
and IaIIae, q.72, a.1 which concerns the inordinateness 
of sin. 
v.Q.43, a.3. 
vi.Steven Windass "Double Think and Double Effect," 
Blackfriars 44 (1963): 261, original emphasis. 
vii.Boyle, 1978 "Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas", Thomist, 
42.4, (1978):649. 
viii.Blaise Pascal Les Provinciales (Paris:Éditions de 
Cluny, 1943), 243. 
ix.For an extended discussion of Pascal's critique, its 
fairness and its influence, see Stephen Toulmin's and 
Albert Jonsen's The Abuse of Casuistry 
(Berkeley:University of California Press, 1988). 
x.Boyle, "Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas," Thomist, 42.4, 
(1978):649-650, emphasis added. 
xi.See Elizabeth Anscombe on this point; Intention 
(Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1957), 47. 
xii.Jonathan Bennett "Whatever the Consequences," Analysis 
26.3 (1966):91. 
xiii.Anthony Kenny, The Anatomy of the Soul: Historical 
Essays in the Philosophy of Mind (Great Britain:Harper 
and Row, 1973), 140. 
xiv.Steven Windass "Double Think and Double Effect," 
Blackfriars 44 (1963): 260, emphasis added. 
xv.Steven Windass "Double Think and Double Effect," 
Blackfriars 44 (1963): 260-261. 
xvi.Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocunque defectu. 
xvii.Steven Windass "Double Think and Double Effect," 
Blackfriars 44 (1963): 261, original emphasis. 
xviii.Boyle, 1978 "Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas", Thomist, 
42.4, (1978):658. 
xix.Boyle, "Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas", Thomist, 42.4, 
  
  
 23 
  
(1978):658. 
xx.Boyle, "Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas", Thomist, 42.4, 
(1978):659, n. 39. 
xxi.For example, in Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, 6, paragraph 
5, cited by Boyle. 
xxii.Pace Alan Donagan. Donagan (perhaps misled by the 
exclusive attention paid by some advocates of DER to the 
intended/foreseen distinction) asserts: 
Finally, the doctrine underlying all forms of the theory 
of double effect is that what lies outside the scope of 
a man's intentions in acting does not belong in his action, 
and so is not subject to moral judgement (Alan Donagan, 
The Theory of Morality Chicago:Chicago university Press, 
1977: 164, emphasis added; see also 122.) 
If this were the case, the second condition would be otiose. 
Clearly, Thomas understands the first condition to be 
necessary, but not sufficient for DER. 
xxiii.McMahan, "Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect," 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11.2 (1994): 202. 
xxiv.McMahan, "Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect," 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11.2 (1994): 211. 
xxv.McMahan, "Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect," 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11.2 (1994):212. 
xxvi.Most contemporary theorists do not use DER to justify 
a private individual's homicidal self-defense. This is 
remarkable considering that Thomas's originating account 
concerned self-defense. However, as Jeff McMahan notes, 
some theorists do use DER to justify a private individual's 
homicidal self defense: G.E.M. Anscombe "War and Murder", 
in J. Rachels (ed.), Moral Problems (New York:Harper and 
Row, 1975):288-289; R. L. Phillips., War and Justice 
(Norman:University of Oklahoma Press, 1984):44-46; and 
J. Finnis, J. Boyle, and G. Grisez Nuclear Deterrence, 
Morality, and Realism (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 
1987):310-318. Anscombe, however, offers a nuanced account 
in which the private individual, if given the authority 
of law, may intentionally take the life of the aggressor. 
This account would retain Aquinas's position that what 
is at issue in the private individual's act of self-defense 
is the authority to take life. 
 
